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READINGS IN JURISPRUDENcE, selected, ed-
ited, and arranged by Jerome Hall.t
Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Com-
pany. 1938. Pp., 1183. $7.50.
Here in 25 chapters, 214 selections, and
some 1200 pages of readings, designed
primarily to be used "in schools as a
source book," Professor Hall seeks "to
integrate jurisprudence in each of its
principal subdivisions, with relevant gen-
eral fields of philosophic and scientific
thought" and so to promote "a general
understanding of some of the foundations
of jurisprudence." Working under the
three main rubrics of "values," "logic,"
and "science," he hopes "to relate juris-
prudence to problems dealt with in other
parts of the curriculum," "to implement
insight into actuality, and to lend a general
cohesiveness to broad ramifications of
thought."
Part One on Philosophy of Law (8
chapters, 332 pages, 79 selections and text
notes) has for its objective "nothing less
than the deliberate formulation and cul-
tivation" by each reader "of his own legal
philosophy." What is the "relationship"
between "law" and "right," "justice,"
"utility," "value," "ethics," "morals,"
"ends," "social purposes," and so on?'
"To what extent is law, itself, an inde-
pendent system of values? What is meant
by law as 'normative'?" What have been
some of "the principal philosophic ap-
proaches to, and analyses" of "the general
problems of end-seeking" and of "value
expression"? Chapter headings are Nat-
ural Law, H is tori c a 1 Jurisprudence,
Transcendental Idealism, Utilitarianism,
Social Functionalism, Pragmatism, Further
Aspects of the Conflict between Empir-
icism and Idealism, and Idealism in the
Judicial Process.
Part Two on Analytical Jurisprudence
(introduction, 7 chapters, 334 pages, and
55 selections) is designed to offer "formal
analysis" of a "general field," in which
t Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
I This is a rough paraphrase of two of Pro-
fessor Hall's prefatory sentences.
2 Hall, 333.
"the need for expert knowledge is more
apparent than elsewhere" and also some
"understanding," in the light of recent
developments, "of logical method in its
application to law." The section is pref-
aced by an italicized quotation from John
Austin,2 who urges upon students "a well-
grounded knowledge of the general prin-
ciples of jurisprudence" to enable them
to see "Law as a whole" and to avoid a
mere "beggarly account of scraps and
fragments." Chapter headings are Logic
and Law, The Nature of Law, Terminology
and Basic Concepts, The Syllogism,3 An-
alogy, Classification, and Formal Science.
Part Three on Law and Social Science
(introduction, 10 chapters, 502 pages, and
80 selections) puts "the emphasis" upon
"an emerging, distinctive, socio-legal dis-
cipline." Students "who wish to think
relevantly to the modern scene, must
come to grips with the problem of the
relations between law and social science."
The term "science of law" provides "the
arena within which the whole sweep of
jurisprudential thought must be reexam-
ined, correctly integrated, and synthe-
sized." This section is prefaced by a
quotation from Justice Holmes,4 who sug-
gests that from law, "the roads are plain
to anthropology, the science of man, to
political economy, the theory of legisla-
tion, ethics, and thus by several paths to
your final view of life." The task of the
thinker is to show the "rational connec-
tion" between his "fact" and "the frame
of the universe." Chapter headings are
Science and Scientific Method, The Na-
ture of Social Science, The General
Theory of an Empirical Science of Law,
Primitive Law, Law and Custom, Social
and Legal Institutions, Social Control-
Non-legal and Legal, Legislation and So-
cial Problems, The Judicial Process, and
Methods of Research.
So much for the purposes and general
outline of Professor Hall's vast undertak-
ing. To criticize in detail his selection of
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materials would be futile. Some readers
may justly wonder whether a single foot-
note reference is enough of Arnold and
Robinson;5 others may wish for a little
Yntema to stir with the Morris Cohen;
and so forth. Still, by and large, Professor
Hall has almost everything-granting his
premises and accepting his objectives-
that anybody could want. His index lists
154 authors; it will be a rare reader who
does not come across some new names.
Generally, the materials are well ar-
ranged, with authors neatly played off
against each other; Lunberg v. Mac Iver,
Timasheff v. Malinowski, Elliott v. Duguit,
Cook v. Adler, Oliphant v. Goodhart, and
so on.
The editing of the materials raises more
question. It borrows too much from the
technique of the fast moving motion-pic-
ture preview. Let us look at the first
chapter on Natural Law. There the selec-
tions are: Plato, Laws, i page; Plato,
Republic, Y2 page; Aristotle, Politics, 13/3
pages; Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, 3
page; Aristotle, Rhetorica, l1/ pages;
Windelband, 9Y pages; Cicero, De Re
Publica, 1 page; Cicero, De Legibus, 4
pages; Maine, Ancient Law, 4 pages; St.
Thomas Aquinas, 13 pages; St. Germain,
4Y pages; Suarez, 133 pages; Grotius,
3Y pages; Hobbes, 5 pages; Maine, An-
cient Law, 2Y2 pages; Burlamaqui, 93
pages; Rutherforth, 6Y pages; Blackstone,
4 Y2 pages; Lorimer, 2% pages; Miltner,
1Y pages; Hill, 2% pages.0 To this kalei-
doscopic hopping, now add severe inter-
nal editing-throughout the book-of in-
dividual selections. So many excisions
are made, for example, from Professor
Underhill Moore's definitive review
7 of
the very kind of book Professor Hall is
editing that a reader, who does not know
the original article, must miss its full blast.
What of the book as a teaching device?
It is a superb bibliographical source;
whatever a teacher's "world views," he
5 Id. at 269.
6 Here are 19 additional citations, 5 quotation
notes, and 3 bibliographical notes. In his first
footnote Professor Hall suggests that a student
should, inter alla, differentiate "the various in-
terpretations of Natural Law from each other,"
determine whether a writer is "discussing fact
or ideal," ascertain the "similarities between the
older systems of Natural Law and current dis-
cussions of idealism," and keep in mind the
should be able to use many sections of
the book as bases for discussion of as-
signed topics. To teach straight through
the book would be practically impossible;
the repetition would, long before the end,
choke both teacher and students. With a
small and able class, the book could pos-
sibly be made the basis for an excellent
experiment in "debabelization," in what
Professor Harold D. Lasswell has called
"symbol analysis."8 Were some such an-
alysis carefully worked out and applied to
the whole of the book, it is probable that
its "communicable" content could be re-
stated in a very few pages.
For a random test, let us take a passage
from Kelsen.9 Here are 10 1-2 pages of
good looking type. What are the author's
"concept" words? What his "index"
words? Which of his statements are
"naturalistic?" Which "preferential"?
Checking the passage hastily, without any
pretense to exactness, we find "law" ap-
pears 77 times, "norm" 39, "theory" 30,
"science" 29, "nature" 14, and "society" 4.
Other obvious "concept" terms are "real-
ity," "value," "essence," "justice," 'ide-
ology," "the Ought," "the Is," "normative
entity," "the legal order," "mental con-
tent," "meaning" and so forth. Among
the adjectives that roll are "pure," "pos-
itive," "fundamental," "self - evident,"
"real," "subjective," "objective," "mental,"
"natural," "absolutely right" "transcen-
dental," and "meta-legal." "Index" words
are almost wholly lacking or cast upon a
level of abstraction practically as high as
that of the "concept" terms. "Society is
... something wholly different from na-
ture, since an entirely different association
of elements." The "real science of law"
has been lost because "jurisprudence" has,
"in wholly uncritical fashion," become
"mixed up with psychology and biology,
with ethics and theology." And so on. An
astute semantician, like Mr. Stuart Chase,
would undoubtedly translate most of this
question: "What social or economic condi-
tions, what desire for reform, what objective
may have stimulated the writer's insistence up-
on and interpretation of Natural Law?" Worthy
advice; but a large order.
7 Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions
(1923) 23 Col. L. Rev. 609; Hall, 961.
s Lasswell and Blumenstock, World Revolu-
tionary Propaganda (1939) Chapter VII.
9 116l, 425-436.
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into blah, blab, blah; he could not dis-
tinguish "preferential" statements from
"naturalistic" or tell why the author
thought what he was saying was impor-
tant. The whole passage has all the ex-
ternal appearances of a vast exercise in
repetitive ambiguity. Nor is this passage
atypical. The book is full of such stuff.
Even some of Professor Hall's footnotes
have about them an air of indefinable
mystery. In one' 0 his "major problem"
is "the positive construction of a theoret-
ical basis for an empirical science of law."
Having in "progressive steps" (the first 3
chapters of Part Three) sought "to analyze
the most important meanings of an em-
pirical 'science of law,'" he poses his most
'insistent' questions: 'Is the behavioristic
interpretation of 'law' essential to the con-
struction of an empirical science of law?
Or, is that interpretation not only not es-
sential, but also fallacious even with ref-
erence to the purpose in hand?" By keep-
ing this question in mind, the reader may
(in working through the next 6 chapters)
"finally achieve an integrated point of
view which he can defend not only in its
own terms, but also upon the basis of
positions previously determined." Earlier
in the book he ascribes the reputed lack
among American "legal realists" of in-
terest in value judgments to pre-occupa-
tion with this same end, "analysis of thp
theoretical basis of an empirical science
of law.""1
In a reprint of one of his own articles
Professor Hall states a goal more under-
standable than any we have listed above:
"Realization of the nature of legal rules
and their administration, and of present,
social problem-solving, as dependent upon
discovery of specific ends and means,
places the emphasis where it needs to be
placed, namely, upon the most detailed
empirical research possible by the most
creative minds that can be listed."'12 In
1929 Professor Karl Llewellyn picked as
the "most immediate aim" of legal re-
search for "the next ten years" the "check-
ing up on the effects of law in life." 3
It is now 1939. The ten years have passed;
10 Id. at 873. Italics Professor Hall's.
:L Id. at 257.
12 Id. at 1075.
:'3 Id. at 235.
24 Id. at 1169.
we have had a great fanfare of restate-
ments, ideologies, and folklores and even
of propaganda for "scientific method." Yet
the list of "factual studies" which Profes-
sor Hall offers at the end of his book is
pitifully small-eleven items and some of
them of no great significance.'14 Is it con-
ceivable that spiritual exhortation is not
exactly the best possible training in sci-
entific method? There may be more than
passing truth in Professor Oliphant's sug-
gestion that "the here-and-now most use-
ful angle of approach to the study of
law" is not "to expound either a theory
of knowledge or a philosophy of life.""
It is perhaps high time that law teachers
should begin to "acquire, and to impart,
training in specific scientific skills.
MYRss S. McDouGAL*
UNIONS oF TmSi OwN CHoosnmw, by Rob-
ert R. R. Brooks.' New Haven: Yale
University Press. 1939. Pp. xiv, 296.
$3.00.
The A. F. of L.-C. I. 0. peace negotia-
tions, the amendments to the Act now
pending consideration in Congress, the re-
cent decisions of the Supreme Court in
Board cases, and the continued barrage of
propaganda and publicity all combine to
make this study of the National Labor
Relations Board and its work exceedingly
timely. Mr. Brooks has not attempted,
primarily, to write a legal text for law-
yers practicing before the Board, although
his effort contains much that they may
find valuable. He has rather set out to
discover the value of the Board's work to
labor, industry, and public. To do so it
has been necessary to study that work in
some detail. Brooks has done a carefully
considered job.
The opening chapter of the book is sure
to come as a revelation to many. Because
the press quite generally places emphasis
on the sensational and the violent in the
news, and also, as Brooks indicates, be-
cause so much of the press has been vio-
lently anti-Board, about five per cent of
the total number of Board cases get sub-
'5 Id. at 754.
* Associate Professor of Law, Yale University.
'Assistant Professor of Economics, Williams
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